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FANCY DANCING IN THE
MARBLE PALACE
Peter Irons*
On October 12, 1944, Solicitor General Charles Fahy took the
podium to urge that the United States Supreme Court affirm the
criminal conviction of Fred Korematsu. The crime involved was
the defendant's refusal in 1942 to obey one of the military "exclusion orders" that forced the mass evacuation from the west coast
and subsequent internment of more than 110,000 Americans of Japanese ancestry. Before he left the podium that afternoon, Fahy had
knowingly and deliberately misled the Court on two crucial issues
raised in this historic case. By an initial margin of one vote and a
final six-to-three division, the Court affirmed the use of military
power that Fahy had passionately defended. I The Court thus sanctioned the expulsion from their homes and detention of American
citizens on the basis of ancestry alone. Fahy's role in the Korematsu
case casts a shadow over an otherwise distinguished career as government counsel and federal judge.2
The transcript of Fahy's argument in Korematsu has an intrinsic historical importance that justifies its publication in this journal.
Its recent discovery, which I recount briefly below, adds to the record of a seminal case in constitutional law, one that balanced the
factors of race and ancestry against the weight of military control
over civilians. But the discovery of this transcript in March 1985
has contemporary significance as well. It came too late to influence
• Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego. I
should note here that I have served as counsel to both Fred Korematsu and Gordon Hirabayashi in their coram nobis efforts.
I. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Justice William 0. Douglas
voted at conference to reverse, and prepared a dissenting opinion, but he later switched his
vote and withdrew his opinion. For an account of the Supreme Court deliberations in this
case, seeP. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 3!9-42 (1983).
2. Lest anyone conclude that I harbor a personal animus toward Fahy, see my admiring account of his service (1935-1940) as general counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board in P. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 226-89 (1982). In that book, I characterized
Fahy as a "legal craftsman" and wrote: "His job was to enforce a statute through the presentation of carefully selected cases in the courts, with meticulous attention to detail and the
formulation of narrowly drawn issues the keys to success." /d. at 235. For tributes to Fahy
after his death by his colleague, Judge David L. Bazelon, and former clerk, Prof. Sherman L.
Cohn, see 68 GEo. L. J. i-vii (1979).
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the outcome of Korematsu's recent challenge to his wartime conviction, a challenge that persuaded a federal judge in October 1983 to
vacate the conviction and grant a coram nobis petition based on
charges of governmental misconduct.3 Although this transcript had
been sought for inclusion in Korematsu's petition, other documents
from government files (discussed below) formed a sufficient basis for
Judge Patel to grant the petition, since the government did not contest the misconduct charges on their merits. 4
The transcript has since been placed in evidence in a related
case, a similar coram nobis petition filed by Gordon Hirabayashi to
challenge his 1942 convictions for violation of military curfew and
exclusion orders. Affirming the convictions in 1943, the Supreme
Court ruled only on the curfew issue and evaded until the next year
the exclusion issue raised in Korematsu.s At a two-week hearing in
Seattle in June 1985, Judge Donald Voorhees allowed the transcript
in evidence since Fahy had made specific reference in his Korematsu
argument to the "military necessity" claims made at length in the
Hirabayashi brief. Over the vehement objection of government lawyers that the Fahy transcript lacked relevance to the Hirabayashi
case, Judge Voorhees permitted Hirabayashi's counsel to question
the veracity and ethical propriety of Fahy's argument.
This brief commentary on the Fahy transcript will first discuss
the circumstances of its discovery, a question raised at the recent
hearing in Seattle. I will then try to place the transcript into the
context of the heated arguments within the Justice Department over
the issues of "military necessity" and detention, disputes that began
during preparation of the government's Supreme Court brief in
Hirabayashi in early 1943 and continued through argument of
Korematsu in late 1944. Finally, I will discuss the relevance of this
transcript to the recent coram nobis cases, two of which are pending
at this writing, and conclude with my assessment of Fahy's behavior
in these historic wartime cases.
I

I think a brief word on the discovery and provenance of this
transcript is in order, although I will shorten this tale of legal archaeology. I began working in 1981 on a book about the Japanese
3. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (opinion of Judge
Marilyn Hall Patel).
4. The government's two-page response to the Korematsu petition called the evacuation and internment an "unfortunate episode" in American history and included a general
denial of the misconduct allegations. Judge Patel considered the government's response ••tantamount to a confession of error." 584 F. Supp. at 1413.
5. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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internment cases. This book, published in 1983 as Justice At War,
recounts in considerable detail the events discussed in this commentary, and provides the primary source citations to documents I cite
below to the book, for ease in reference.6 Early in my research, I
requested from the Justice Department access to the original litigation files in these cases. Sad to say, I was first told, the files had
been "lost" many years ago and no record existed of their
disposition.
But with an unaccustomed-at least to me--diligence, Justice
staffers continued their search and informed me in October 1981
that the missing litigation files had been located in a most unlikely
place, the files of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, an
agency with no involvement in these cases. 1 When the internment
case files were finally opened for my inspection, they had not been
screened and rested in three dusty cardboard boxes. Virtually the
first document I examined in the Korematsu file was a memorandum from a Justice Department lawyer that warned Solicitor General Fahy not to pass on War Department "lies" to the Supreme
Court. Another document in the Hirabayashi file cautioned Fahy
that he risked the "suppression of evidence" in withholding crucial
military intelligence reports from the Supreme Court.s
As I dug through these files, I eagerly looked for transcripts of
the Supreme Court arguments that Fahy made in both Hirabayashi
and Korematsu. My appetite was whetted by finding a partial transcript of his argument in the Endo case, which was argued the same
day as Korematsu.9 The Korematsu file included records showing
that Fahy had ordered a transcript of his argument and that two
copies had been delivered to his office. But I could find neither copy
in the Justice Department files provided to me, and I had no reason
to believe the file was incomplete.
Needless to say, the documents I found in the files became an
6. P. IRONS, supra note I.
7. Although the internment cases were prosecuted at trial by local U.S. attorneys and
appeals would normally be handled by the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, they
were actually handled by the Alien Enemy Control Unit, headed by Edward Ennis; this unit
was established in December 1941 and abolished in 1946. Perhaps the title of this unit led
someone to assume that its records should be sent to INS.
8. See P. IRONS, supra note I, at 204, 288.
9. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). This case involved a habeas corpus challenge
by a young woman who filed a petition after reporting for detention. The Supreme Court
unanimously concluded that Congress had not authorized the indefinite detention of concededly loyal citizens, although the constitutional challenge to detention was not decided.
I should add that before 1955, when the Court began recording and transcribing all oral
arguments (transcripts and tape recordings are available from the National Archives), counsel were responsible for hiring a private court-reporting firm if they wanted transcripts. Fahy
only had his own argument transcribed, and those of his opponents in Korematsu are not
available.
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important part of my book. After I interviewed the defendants in
the criminal cases, their reaction to these records led to my involvement as an attorney in efforts to vacate their convictions on the
ground of governmental misconduct. In order to complete the
coram nobis petitions, I continued my search for the missing Korematsu transcript; no record existed of a similar Hirabayashi transcript. Over the next three years, I searched through Fahy's files in
the Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York, and in the Library
of Congress. I asked the clerk and librarian of the Supreme Court
to look for the transcript. I enlisted the help of Fahy's family in
searching their attics and basements. Fahy's opponent in the case,
Charles Horsky, looked in his files. I tracked down in Florida the
retired head of the court-reporting firm that made the transcript.
Fahy's secretary in 1944 and the person who ordered the transcripts, Mildred Fanebust, still worked in 1983 as secretary to Solicitor General Rex Lee. Ms. Fanebust searched her files, but neither
she nor anyone else could locate the elusive document.
Almost convinced that my quest was quixotic, I gave up for
two years. But, during a quick visit to the National Archives in
March 1985, I asked an archivist if I could look again at the cardindex file on the Korematsu case, from which I obtained the case-file
number in 1981. The cards had since been closed to researchers,
she told me, but she volunteered to look through them for me. Had
I ever looked, she asked, for an "enclosures" file in the case? When
I professed ignorance, she said that bulky or superfluous documents
were often stored in such files. Five minutes later, a staffer at the
Federal Records Center just outside Washington called back toreport that the missing transcript was indeed in the "enclosures" file,
the existence of which had never been disclosed in response to my
longstanding Freedom of Information Act and judicial discovery
requests.1o
10. I recount this otherwise unexciting tale of the unanticipated reward for persistence
because of its possible legal significance. The Justice Department lawyer now defending the
government against Hirabayashi"s misconduct charges has argued vehemently-and thus far
with no success-that the coram nobis petition is barred by laches; the relevant evidence has
been available for almost forty years, he claims, and Hirabayashi has waited too long to
reopen his case. But at the Seattle hearing before Judge Voorhees in June 1985, Edward
Ennis testified about the substance of the Fahy transcript, and I testified about my continuing
search for it in countering the government's laches defense. Although Judge Voorhees has
not ruled on the petition at this writing, he indicated in comments to the government's disputatious lawyer that he found no merit in the laches argument. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Voorhees asked both sides for posttrial briefs in place of closing arguments and set
October 4, 1985, as the deadline for briefs. His ruling on the petition will come at some time
after this date.
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II

Let me turn now to the substance of Fahy's argument in Korematsu, and discuss what the transcript adds to our knowledge and
understanding of the issues in the case. Two issues in particular
require some background and context. The year before this argument, Fahy had defended the conviction of Gordon Hirabayashi on
the ground that "military necessity" had justified the curfew and
exclusion orders as a means of preventing espionage and sabotage
by Japanese Americans. The government's Hirabayashi brief had
outlined this argument at length, and the Supreme Court had unanimously echoed Fahy's claims that Army "findings of danger from
espionage and sabotage," combined with findings of "disloyalty"
among the Japanese Americans, made the curfew order an "appropriate measure" to deal with these dangers. 11
When Fahy returned to the Court to defend the exclusion order that Korematsu had challenged, he concealed from the Justices
all evidence of an internal insurrection that he had quashed just
days before. At issue was the veracity of the Final Report of General John L. DeWitt, who had both urged and implemented the
mass evacuation and internment of Japanese Americans. DeWitt
had flatly charged in this official report to the Secretary of War that
evidence of espionage by Japanese Americans had prompted his
evacuation recommendation. DeWitt's report cited "hundreds of
reports nightly of signal lights visible from the coast, and of intercepts of unidentified radio transmissions" from the mainland to
offshore Japanese submarines as justification for evacuation.12
These espionage charges aroused the suspicions of two Justice
Department lawyers, Edward Ennis and John Burling, who were
responsible for the government's Korematsu brief. The two men
prevailed on Attorney General Francis Biddle to ask the FBI and
the Federal Communications Commission to investigate DeWitt's
charges. Both agencies reported to Biddle that exhaustive investigations had completely refuted the espionage claims. FBI Director
Hoover found no evidence that Japanese Americans "have been associated with any espionage activity ashore or that there has been
any illicit shore-to-ship signaling, either by radio or lights."l3 FCC
Chairman James L. Fly assured Biddle that his agency had investigated hundreds of reports of suspicious radio transmissions and that
DeWitt's charges "indicating the existence of illicit radio signaling
II.
12.
13.

320 U.S. at 103-04.
P. IRONS, supra note I, at 279.
Id. at 281.
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cannot be regarded as well-founded."I4
The reports from Hoover and Biddle prompted Ennis and
Burling to draft a footnote for the Korematsu brief, designed to
wave a red flag before the Justices. DeWitt's claim of "military necessity" and his supporting evidence of "the use of illegal radio
transmitters and ... shore-to-ship signaling by persons of Japanese
ancestry," Ennis and Burling wrote, were "in conflict with information in the possession of the Department of Justice. In view of the
contrariety of the reports on this matter we do not ask the Court to
take judicial notice of the recital of those facts contained in the Report."1s It is hard to imagine a more pointed refutation of a document on which the government proposed to rest its defense of
DeWitt's exclusion orders.
What happened after Ennis and Burling drafted their confessional footnote can only be summarized here. Before the printed
brief reached the Supreme Court, Assistant Secretary of War John
J. McCloy read the drafted footnote, called Fahy to complain, and
prevailed on the Solicitor General to stop the printing presses and
remove the offending language. After some indecision, Fahy complied with McCloy's request and finally approved substitute language drafted by Herbert Wechsler, who headed the War Division
of the Justice Department. Assuring McCloy's deputy that he revised the footnote to refer to DeWitt's report "in the gentlest conceivable way," Wechsler settled on language that "we rely upon the
Final Report only to the extent that it relates" to details of the evacuation process.I6 Fahy endorsed Wechsler's revision and sent the
brief back to the printers.
The transcript of Fahy's argument shows the extent to which
DeWitt's report dominated the proceeding. Charles Horsky and
Wayne Collins, who shared the podium for Korematsu, both had
denounced the report the previous day. Collins had argued that the
public record provided no evidence of espionage or sabotage by Japanese Americans and that DeWitt's orders thus lacked any "rational basis" in fact; Horsky had also intimated that Fahy doubted
the veracity of DeWitt's espionage charges. Pointing the Court to
the watered-down footnote in the government's brief, Horsky suggested that it could be read as an admission that no evidence existed
to support the charges. 11
Fahy's response to these pointed remarks went far beyond the
Id. at 283.
/d. at 284-92.
16. /d. at 291.
17. For an account of the oral arguments ofHorsky and Collins, see id. at 311-15. This
account is based on the handwritten notes made by an Army observer and an interview with
14.

15.
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limits of partisan argument. Answering the claims that DeWitt had
"no rational basis on which to make a military judgment," Fahy
denied that "a single line, a single word, or a single syllable" in the
report could cast any doubt on the "military necessity" basis for
DeWitt's orders. Later in his argument, Fahy assured Chief Justice
Stone that "the report proves the basis for the exclusion orders."
This flat endorsement of a document the FBI and FCC had tom to
shreds, and that Ennis had urged Fahy to repudiate, turned on its
head the Solicitor General's dismissal of his opponents' arguments
as "a neat little piece of fancy dancing." Fahy himself danced
around the ambiguous footnote in denying that "the Government
has repudiated the military necessity of the evacuation." His claim
that "no person in any responsible position has ever taken a contrary position" was a flat out lie. As Director of the Alien Enemy
Control Unit, Ennis had consistently opposed the evacuation, and
Attorney General Biddle had made a futile objection to Roosevelt
that the War Department had no military basis for the forced exodus of civilians.'s

III
Fahy also misled the Court in his argument on a second major
issue in the Korematsu case, that of the link between evacuation and
detention. As the transcript demonstrates, this was a complex issue
that confounded the Justices, spilled over into the related Endo
case, and rested on evidence absent from the skimpy trial court record in the case. The issue of detention as a concomitant of evacuation was nonetheless crucial; Fahy's concession in Endo that
Congress had not authorized the indefinite detention of loyal citizens forced him in Korematsu to minimize the connection. Fahy
was fortunate that Wayne Collins, who defended Korematsu at
trial, had neglected this question and had failed to build a record of
documents and testimony for the Supreme Court.I9
What Fahy wanted to avoid in his Korematsu argument was
any admission that Fred Korematsu, had he reported as ordered to
the assembly center at the required time on May 9, 1942, would
have been held in detention for a period that had no predetermined
limit. John Burling, who began his work on the Korematsu brief
with the belief that Japanese Americans had been offered the chance
Horsky. My account ofFahy's argument, at 315-17, is also based on the Army notes and is
now superseded by the full transcript.
18. On Biddle's objections, see id. at 61-63. For Biddle's later reflections about his
failure to press his objections more strongly, see F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 213-26
(1962).
19. P. IRONS, supra note I, at 295.
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for "voluntary migration" from the west coast, changed his mind
after a careful review of the record. "Contrary to the assumptions
upon which we in this office have been going for some time," he
wrote Fahy in April 1944, "the original detention was not ordered
as a mere temporary expedient, to be in effect for a few days while
the persons were removed from California, nor was it in any sense
hypothetical or speculative." The offer of "voluntary migration"
had in fact expired before Korematsu was compelled to report for
evacuation. zo
Burling pleaded with Fahy before the argument not to adopt
the War Department's claim, expressed in the DeWitt report, that
the "voluntary migration" program was abandoned after exclusion
orders were issued, and only after the governors of interior states
refused to allow Japanese Americans to settle in their states. Burling knew, and told Fahy, that detention in assembly centers, and
subsequent indefinite detention in the relocation camps, had been
decided as a policy well before the hostile governors met with Army
officials on April 7, 1942. Burling's point was that Korematsu, even
before he became subject to the exclusion order, could not have left
his home town, and that on May 9 it became a crime to remain
there. His only lawful alternative to this dilemma was indefinite
detention.
When he appeared before the Supreme Court, Fahy ignored
Burling's protests and claimed that mass evacuation was adopted
only because voluntary migration "did not work" and only after "a
great wall of hostility" was erected in the Rocky Mountain states.
Fahy's bathetic evocation of "old men, old women, babies in arms,
and children" being forced into the deserts and mountains "at the
point of a bayonet" was, in truth, not the unfortunate alternative to
voluntary migration but the calculated policy of the government.
Fahy additionally misled the Court in denying that Korematsu, had he reported for evacuation, would necessarily "have
found himself in a relocation center." That is exactly where Korematsu would have found himself. Fahy's vague reference to "security reasons" as a basis for the release of some Japanese Americans
from the assembly centers evaded two issues. First, release was entirely discretionary with Army officials; and second, those released
were required to remain outside the west coast area designated as a
"military zone." Nothing in the record countered Burling's claim
that Korematsu faced an indefinite period of detention. Fahy knew
this as he assured the Court that even after issuance of the exclusion
order Korematsu "could go where he would." Korematsu could go
20.

/d. at 293. The full account of this dispute between Burling and Fahy is at 292-302.
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only one place on May 9, 1942, and that was a barbed-wire
compound.
IV
What impact might this transcript have on the pending coram
nobis cases that seek vacation of criminal convictions in 1942? The
Korematsu petition has reached final decision, on a record that did
not include this petition. But the available record, including many
of the documents cited above, provided Judge Patel with adequate
grounds for granting the petition. The full record of the case, she
wrote, demonstrates the falsity of the espionage charges in the DeWitt report and "is replete with protestations of various Justice Department officials that the government had the obligation to advise
the courts of the contrary facts and opinions." She also found "substantial support in the record that the government deliberately
omitted relevant information and provided misleading information
in papers before the court." Without direct reference to Fahy, but
with his role in the case obvious from the context, Judge Patel concluded that the "judicial process is seriously impaired when the government's law enforcement officers violate their ethical obligations
to the court. "2t
In the two pending cases, Yasui and Hirabayashi, the Fahy
transcript might well affect the outcomes, at least in adding to the
weight of the evidence already before the courts. The attention
given to the transcript at the recent Hirabayashi hearing in Seattle,
and the interest that Judge Voorhees displayed in the testimony of
Edward Ennis about his wartime conflicts with Charles Fahy, suggest that the transcript might well figure in the final opinion on the
petition. The glaring disparity between the FBI and FCC refutations of DeWitt's espionage charges and Fahy's unbending endorsement of the report certainly adds weight to the misconduct charges
raised in the Hirabayashi petition.
Finally, what does this argument transcript tell us about Fahy?
He emerges from the printed page as a masterful advocate. Softspoken and short in stature, and nicknamed "Whispering Charlie"
21. 584 F. Supp. at 1418, 1420. I should note that the Supreme Court decided a third
criminal case, one that challenged only the curfew and that was decided along with Hiraba·
yashi. Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943). The trial judge had held both that the
curfew regulation was unconstitutional as applied to citizens and that Yasui had renounced
his citizenship by employment in the Japanese consulate before the war. The Supreme Court
sustained the conviction but reversed the judge on both issues. In February 1984, Judge
Robert Belloni of the U.S. District Court in Portland, Oregon, vacated Yasui's conviction on
the government's motion and dismissed his petition. Yasui has appealed this latter ruling and
the case is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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by the press, Fahy was adept in fielding (and sometimes deflecting)
questions from the bench. He projected an image of openness and
brought a reputation for integrity to the Supreme Court podium.
What went wrong in the Korematsu case? Did he go over the line of
ethical behavior, as Judge Patel's opinion concludes? And was
Fahy the only culpable official?
The first of these questions is difficult to answer in this brief
commentary. The conclusion that Fahy became trapped between
the wartime pressures that gripped the entire government and his
professional and ethical obligations is both true and simplistic.
Such a formula could excuse virtually any act, as was attempted in
far more extreme cases after the war by the Nuremberg defendants.
Fahy was, however, a man of deep respect for military authority; he
was inclined to defer to arguments of "military necessity" and to
men like John McCloy. One need not borrow from psychobiography to understand Fahy as a man lacking in subtlety, who felt
strongly that Japanese Americans should share the "hardships of
millions of our people in the fight of the nation for its life."
The complete record leaves no real doubt that Fahy misled the
Supreme Court in the Korematsu case. Edward Ennis, who ultimately swallowed his protests and signed the government's brief,
told Judge Voorhees in 1985 that the crucial footnote represented
"the narrowest path available to avoid censurable misconduct."
Harried by his opponents and questioned sharply by the Court,
Fahy strayed from that narrow path in vouching for every line,
word, and syllable of DeWitt's tainted report.
One might argue that Fahy had no obligation to disclose the
FBI and FCC reports to the Supreme Court, as Ennis and Burling
urged. One might also note that Collins and Horsky, in defending
Korematsu, cast doubt on DeWitt's espionage charges, doubt that
was echoed in the scathing dissent of Justice Frank Murphy.22 Full
disclosure of every piece of potentially exculpatory evidence was not
then a prosecutorial duty, and Ennis accepted Fahy's power to
overrule him on this issue. However culpable in misleading the
Court, Fahy had acceded to McCloy's protest over the original redflag footnote. McCloy, who supported mass evacuation in 1942 and
defended it four decades later as "retribution" for Pearl Harbor,
22. 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). In addition to blasting the majority opinion as a "legalization of racism," Murphy tore the DeWitt report to shreds and
noted that "there was no adequate proof that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
military and naval intelligence services did not have the espionage and sabotage situation well
in hand" at the time of evacuation. /d. at 241-42. This point, which echoed the arguments of
Collins and Horsky, hardly answers the claim that Fahy had a positive duty to inform the
Court of the existence and contents of the FBI and FCC reports.
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certainly bears more blame and shame than Fahy in the final
calculus of ethical failure.
But the Solicitor General speaks for the American people when
he appears before the Supreme Court in its marble palace. If he
does not address the Court fully and honestly, he betrays the people's trust and undermines the Court's integrity. In this case,
Charles Fahy bears the responsibility for persuading the Court to
violate the rights of Fred Korematsu, a man of quiet dignity who
waited forty years for his ultimate vindication.
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APPENDIX

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
OCTOBER TERM, 1944.

FRED TOYOSABURO KOREMATSU,
Appellant,
No. 22.

VS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
Washington, D.C.,
Thursday, October 12, 1944.
The arguments in the above-entitled matter were resumed at 12 o'clock noon.
BEFORE:
CHIEF JUSTICE HARLAN F. STONE and
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES ROBERTS, BLACK,
REED, FRANKFURTER, DOUGLAS, MURPHY,
JACKSON, and RUTLEDGE.
APPEARANCES:
On behalf of Appellant:

Mr. Jackson H. Ralston
Mr. Wayne M. Collins
Mr. Charles A. Horsky.
On behalf of Appellee:
Mr. Charles Fahy, Solicitor General of the United States.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Proceed with the case now on argument, No. 22, Korematsu
against The United States. Mr. Fahy.
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ORAL ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF APPELLEE,
BY MR. CHARLES FAHY, SOLICITOR
GENERAL.
MR. FAHY: If the Court please, before entering into the main argument in support of
this conviction, I should like to make a statement, and then pass it and revert to the subject
matter later in the course of my argument. It grows out of the statements read to the Court
toward the close of yesterday's session, from the Attorney General, Mr. Justice Byrnes, and
Secretary Ickes, from which the Court might gain the impression that there was a division of
opinion within the executive branch of the Government. I state that each of those statements
was made with respect to a part of the program which I believe I shall be able to demonstrate
to the Court is in no way involved in this case.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Will you refer to the place where they are printed?
MR. F AHY: They are printed in the amicus curiae brief, and were referred to in oral
arguments.
The proposition which I desire to state in that connection-and then I wish to leave it,
because I wish to have that before the Court and behind me before I enter the argument of
the case-is that the Government stands four square and indivisible in support of this conviction and of the constitutionality of all issues which we believe are involved in this case.
The case is an unusual one. The Court is called upon to exercise, in the judicial function,
a review of what was essentially a military order. That came about in this way: After the
attack of Pearl Harbor, and after the military commander of the Western Defense Command,
a command covering an area which had been activated as a theater of operations by the War
Department, urged the War Department and the Executive, and the Office of the Secretary of
War-the Office of the Secretary of War, supporting the commander in the field, urged the
President, and the latter, in his capacity as President and Commander in Chief, on February
19th ordered that, in view of the necessity growing out of the large defense facilities on the
West Coast and the threat of invasion there, the Secretary of War or the military commander
designated by him, should have authority to prevent espionage and sabotage in the face of the
threat of invasion, to exclude persons from the areas and to take such other steps as might be
deemed wise in the discretion of the commanding general or that of the Secretary of War, to
control espionage with respect to restrictions upon the rights of the people to be, enter, or
remain in the area. That was February 19th.
The commanding general, Lieutenant General DeWitt, was designated by the Secretary
of War, and under the authority thus given, created certain military areas by his public proclamation No. I, of March 2nd, in which he stated that from large areas thereafter any and all
persons may be excluded under the authority granted under the Executive Order of February
19th.
Thereafter the matter was urgently submitted to Congress by the Secretary of War,
through the chairmen of the appropriate committees and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to enact a statute so that these orders would not simply be carried out by the
military, but that the civil branch of the Government would support the enforcement of
necessary restrictions. That was done, after Congress was advised by the Chairman of the
Military Affairs Committee, when the matter was under discussion, under the scope of the
authority previously granted and then being exercised, the evacuation of persons of Japanese
ancestry, citizens and non-citizens, was then under way under the Executive Order, and after
the Tolan committee, which had studied the situation in the field with great thoroughness
and temperateness, had reported to the Congress that the judgment of the military that there
should be such evacuation could not seriously be questioned.
Congress enacted the statute here involved, making it a misdemeanor for any one to
disobey any of the restrictions contained in orders made within the purview of the Executive
Order of February 19, as ratified-as this Court held in the Hirabayashi case-by the act of
Congress of March 21, 1942.
It is in that manner that the courts are asked to review what, as I stated a moment ago,
was essentially a military movement in the field of operations-a very unusual situation, and
one which, because of its character and the necessities of the manner in which war is conducted, should be subject to limited review. This Court said, in the Hirabayashi case, that the
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review was one of a limited character and set forth the principles under which the judiciary
should approach the review of such orders.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Your opponent says that Congress knew about the exclusion,
but did not know about the segregation and detention.
MR. FAHY: Congress did know, Your Honor. I am now speaking of evacuation.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: I thought you were speaking of the exclusion.
MR. F AHY: I was at the moment, Your Honor.
Public Proclamation No. I, of March 2, 1942, notified all that persons would be excluded. It was reported on the floor of the Senate that evacuation had begun, before the act
was passed. The Tolan committee report forecast the continuation of the plans for
evacuation.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The act itself refers to exclusion.
MR. FAHY: The act itself refers specifically to exclusion.
After the statute was passed, exclusion orders in large number were issued. The way the
program was carried on was that the military area as a whole was subdivided into zones, and
individual exclusion orders with respect to each zone were issued seriatim, affecting those in
the particular area described. Such individual exclusion orders were effective as of a certain
date specified in the order. That was the manner in which the program was carried out in an
orderly fashion.
Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, of May 3, 1942, was the one which was applicable to
the area where the petitioner resided. He knew of it, as he says in his testimony, which is a
requirement, I believe, or a necessary element in the violation of the statute. He desired to
remain there, believing that because he was a loyal American native-born citizen, it was beyond the power of the Government to require that he be removed, and so he disobeyed the
order. An information was filed against him, alleging that disobedience, and he was convicted because, in fact, he had remained when the order said that he should go. That constituted the violation of the statute.
In the first place, we say that the order, as I have already related, was clearly within the
scope of the statute, leaving as the first fundamental question in the case, "Was the application of the order to the respondent constitutional and consistent with due process if otherwise
constitutional?"
That brings us to the question of the nature of the order in relation to the military
situation, and the efforts made in this manner to protect the West Coast, under the threat of
invasion, from espionage and sabotage.
The facts in that regard are essentially the same as those reviewed by this Court in the
Hirabayashi case, fully briefed by the Government. Because the question was fully briefed in
that case, it is briefed with less elaboration in this case.
It was suggested here yesterday, and it is argued with some vigor in the brief of the
Amicus Curiae, that notwithstanding the decision of the Court in the Hirabayashi case that
the orders were justified under the exercise of the war power, the Court did not then have
before it all the facts, and that now, after the event, we know that the facts did not justify
evacuation as a military measure.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: What do you mean by that? Is it argued that there was no
basis on which the military judgment could be founded?
MR. FAHY: It must be that, Your Honor, because that is the test. The final report of
General DeWitt was held up to Your Honors yesterday as proving that he himself had no
rational basis on which to make a military judgment. I am not going into the details of that
report, because no doubt the Court will read it. However, I do assert that there is not a single
line, a single word, or a single syllable in that report which in any way justifies the statement
that General DeWitt did not believe he had, and did not have, a sufficient basis, in honesty
and good faith, to believe that the measures which he took were required as a military necessity in protection of the West Coast.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Has each of us a copy of that report'
MR. FAHY: I think not, Your Honor; but I am sure the War Department can make
them available.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Will you make them available?
MR. FAHY: Yes.
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It is even suggested that because of some foot note in our brief in this case indicating that
we do not ask the Court to take judicial notice of the truth of every recitation or instance in
the final report of General DeWitt, that the Government has repudiated the military necessity of the evacuation. It seems to me, if the Court please, that that is a neat little piece of
fancy dancing. There is nothing in the brief of the Government which is any different in this
respect from the position it has always maintained since the Hirabayashi case-that not only
the military judgment of the general, but the judgment of the Government of the United
States, has always been in justification of the measures taken; and no person in any responsible position has ever taken a contrary position, and the Government does not do so now.
Nothing in its brief can validly be used to the contary.
I hesitate to go over the military situation; but if the evacuation was within the war
power, it grew out of the military situation exteriorally in relation to the situation interiorally
on the West Coast, which this Court has heretofore fully reviewed.
It was even suggested here yesterday that that was all a mistake, because in June the
battle of Midway turned back the threat of invasion. It is difficult to see how, because of the
battle of Midway in June, or because of activities in the Solomon Islands in August, 1942, the
threat of invasion of the Pacific Coast in the winter of 1941 and 1942 could have been said not
to have existed. If it be true that the battle of Midway did stop or retard the threat of
invasion after those measures had been taken, it cannot be said that prior to that there had
not been a threat of invasion; and if it is said, let it be said to those who turned back that
particular threat then, if they can be reached where they lie at the bottom of the Pacific
Ocean, among the hulls of the warships which went down with them in that battle-contemporaneously with which, as a matter of fact, the Japanese did land upon the territory of the
United States in the Aleutian Islands.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What is the status of this report? It does not seem to be a
report to Congress.
MR. FAHY: No. It is a report of the commanding general to the Secretary of War.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it your view that the Court can take judicial notice of the
facts which it recites?
MR. FAHY: Not all of them, Your Honor. I think the Court is required to take judicial notice only of those facts which are of the character of public general knowledge. Beyond that, as to the details in the report, certainly the Court is entitled, it seems to me, to
consider them in proving what the general was thinking, his motive, and what he had before
him when he made the judgment which he made. Otherwise I see nothing to be done, if the
Court please, except that the case go back to be heard, and that all this be gone into in a trial,
which the Government does not suggest.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There is a difference on that point. One of the briefs takes
very sharp issue with some of the statements of fact.
MR. FAHY: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in certain instances in which the report is silent as to
dates, it is pointed out that the occurrences stated in the report were after the Japanese had
all been evacuated. What is our duty in a case of that kind? Where do we get the facts, if the
facts become important?
MR. FAHY: I do not think Your Honor can rely upon the facts other than those which
are matters of common knowledge, or which come from sources of which the Court can take
judicial notice, and from which such facts can be made available to the Court. If it should
become important, we would make every effort to do that.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: As I understood the argument of the other side, it was that this
report, taken as a whole, could be taken to exclude the possibility of a basis for military
judgment to continue these exclusion orders. We are dealing now only with exclusion orders.
MR. FAHY: Yes; that is their position.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Do you challenge that position?
MR. FAHY: We say that the report proves the basis for the exclusion orders. There is
not a line in it that can be taken in any other way. It is a complete justification and explanation of the reasons which led to his judgment.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: What about the point made in the discussion yesterday, that,
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whatever it showed, we could or could not take it as being all that was known, or could be
known, by the military authorities in forming this judgment?
MR. FAHY: If there is known to the Court, through all the sources available to the
Court, sufficient from which the Court, in the absence of any rebuttal, could pass upon the
question of the rationality of the military judgment, that would be an end of it. If, as a matter
of fact, from all the Court can take judicial notice of, or consider in any other way, the Court
is left in doubt as to whether there was a rational basis for the judgment, I think you have a
different question. We stand on the proposition that there is sufficient, from what is known as
a matter of public knowledge, and which is not controverted, to support the judgment. We
are not speaking here, Your Honor, of merely the judgment of the commanding general in the
area.
That brings me to a point which I wish to emphasizeTHE CHIEF JUSTICE: Before you come to that, does your brief make any analysis of
the report, or give page references to the parts upon which you rely?
MR. FAHY: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: Suppose the commanding general, when he issued
Order No. 34, had said, in effect, "It is my judgment that, as a matter of security, there is no
danger from the Japanese operations; but under cover of war, I had authority to take advantage of my hostility and clear the Japanese from this area." Suppose he had said that, with
that kind of crude candor. It would not have been within his authority, would it?
MR FAHY: It would not have been.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: As I understand the suggestion, it is that, as a matter of law, the report of General DeWitt two years later proved that that was exactly what the
situation was. As I understand, that is the legal significance of the argument.
MR. FAHY: That is correct, Your Honor; and the report simply does nothing of the
kind.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: Did the order affect Japanese, or Americans?
MR. FAHY: It affected all persons of Japanese ancestry, which included both Americans and aliens of Japanese ancestry.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: Assuming that the order was issued in good faith, and that
the military necessity for it was clear, was any administrative provision made for an American citizen of Japanese blood to prove that he was loyal?
MR. FAHY: There was such a provision later, but not during the progress of the evacuation itself.
MR. JUSTICE REED: Did the defendant raise any question in regard to the reasonable
basis of the order?
MR. FAHY: Your Honor, I think my answer should be "yes," because he filed very
voluminous objections, and I think you could read into those objections as a whole a demurrer to the information.
MR. JUSTICE REED: A demurrer which would be directed at the basis of the order?
MR. FAHY: That is what I mean.
MR. JUSTICE REED: What about attacking the basis of information which General
DeWitt had for issuing the order?
MR. FAHY: There was nothing but the demurrer, Your Honor.
MR. JUSTICE REED: Then, in your judgment, do we have to meet the question as to
whether or not there was reasonable information which led the general to that decision?
MR. FAHY: I rather think so, Your Honor, for this reason: I think there would be no
judicial review of such an order ordinarily; but here the Government, acting entirely properly, did not wish to carry out this order by forceful ejection unless it were necessary, so ~t
came to Congress and called upon the civil branch of the Government to make noncompliance with the order a misdemeanor. That was in aid of enforcement. Having done that, the
case is subject to review, and I think the review can probe whether or not the order was valid,
because of those circumstances. In order to find that it was not valid, this Court would have
to find that it was so arbitrary that it had no reasonable relation to the defense of the West
Coast.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: I suppose you agree that an order of this kind would always be
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open to review on the basis of changed circumstances taking out from under it the support on
which it originally rested.
MR. FAHY: Yes, Your Honor, under the same test which I have stated. However, in
this case the review must be based on the circumstances which existed in May, 1942.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: That is correct.
MR. FAHY: As to General DeWitt's report, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, he concludes his
report, after reviewing all the reasons which had motivated him from a military standpoint,
with the following statement:
"The Commanding General, charged, as he was, with the mission of providing for the
defense of the West Coast, had to take into account these and other military considerations."
He had referred to them in the body of his report.
"He had no alternative but to conclude that the Japanese constituted a potentially dangerous element from the viewpoint of military security; and military necessity required their
immediate evacuation to the interior. The impelling military necessity had become such that
any measures other than those pursued along the Pacific Coast might have been too little and
too late."
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: That does not preclude the conviction that a wiser
man would not have so concluded.
MR. FAHY: Of course not. The military may make mistakes. We know of many that
have been publicized during this war. I will not say "many." We know of some. For example, in the invasion of Sicily, hundreds of our own men were shot down by our own forces.
Someone made a mistake.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The military necessity could not be measured wholly in terms
of invasion. It included the dangers envisaged by the Presidential order, which related to
espionage and sabotage.
MR. FAHY: That is correct. The report goes into that aspect of it. He views the
situation from the standpoint of the deterioration, as he calls it, of the military situation in the
Pacific in relation to the situation interiorally on the Pacific Coast, and comes to the judgment that under the threat arising from the exterior, with all the facilities on the West Coast,
the danger was such that he could not feel secure in the defense of the Coast without the
removal of this part of the population.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: Is there anything in the record which shows, or can
we take judicial notice of the fact that orders such as Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 are
automatically reported to the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff?
MR. FAHY: They are published immediately in the Federal Register, Your Honor.
Perhaps I am going a little beyond the record here. That brings me to the point which I
started to make a few moments ago.
It is argued here, if the Court please, in addition to the contention that there was no
military need, that the military commander, in carrying out this program through these orders, was exceeding his own authority. That argument has been made. It is one of the fundamental errors of the brief of the Amicus Curiae. They suggest to this Court a narrow basis of
decision, that what was done was done by the general without the authority of his
Government.
I have a word to speak for my Government now. It seeks no scapegoat in this case, be he
general, or be he a civil employee engaged in subsequent phases of this difficult program. The
Government hopes, with all earnestness, that this Court will reject any such basis of decision
that the Government of the United States is not responsible for what, in fact, the Government
did in this matter. It desires to stand or fall, as a Government, on whether or not the Constitution has been violated, and not on some squeamish approach to this case, on the ground
that someone, in the execution of this program, has exceeded the authority which was
granted to him. This is not an instance of a subordinate in some isolated case going beyond
the scope laid down by the legislative or executive authority.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Is this part of your argument addressed to the argument on the
other side that this order was pressed to an extent and scope which Congress did not contemplate in passing the legislation?
MR. FAHY: Yes, Your Honor.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: I should like to interrupt just long enough to ask you whether
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it appears in this record that this order was in any way reviewed by higher military authorities-the military hierarchy higher than General DeWitt?
MR FAHY: No; I cannot say that the record does show that. I am sure the record does
not. The record is a very simple little record of what happened in the trial court.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: I mean something of which we could take judicial notice.
MR. FAHY: Think of the scope of the program. It was notorious. It was one of the
great measures taken internally in the United States in connection with this great War. Is it
to be assumed, or can it be thought, that the War Department was unconscious of this, when
every one else knew about it? Every one did know about it. Can it be thought that the
Congress was unconscious of it when every one else knew about it? As a matter of fact,
Congress was told about it, as I have already pointed out, before it passed the act in aid of the
execution of the evacuation. The same thing applies, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, to the
detention during evacuation.
If this is to be stricken down, if the Court please, let it be stricken down by a worthy
instrument such as the due process clause of the Constitution, and not because it can be
thought for a moment that the Government of the United States did not, in fact, do what the
Government of the United States in fact did. That is all we think is involved in this case; but
our opponents say that more is involved-that detention during evacuation is involved. I
have felt that it was not involved, because the information in this case charges him with
remaining where he had no right to be. That was all that was charged against him, and that
was all that was tried. In page after page of objections in the demurrer which he filed to the
information he raised no question of the invalidity of the assembly center, which is the detention aspect of the evacuation; and the question was not decided by the District Court or by
the Circuit Court of Appeals. Of course, that is not controlling on this Court if the question
is involved. I am convinced that the Court should not pass over into that phase of the program, to which he was never subjected, although 100,000 others were, and never raised the
question. None of those who were subject to detention ever raised the question of the assembly center.
The reason why I think the Court should not reach into that phase of the program is that
there is simply no way of saying, from this record, that he did object to that phase of the
program. What this young man was fighting was exclusion. He said that he was an American citizen, and that the action in this case violated his rights. There is nothing from which
the Court can say that if exclusion was valid, or if he knew he had to go, he himself would
have preferred to go in another way than that which had been provided by the Government,
as all the others went. For all we know, he had no objection to going in that manner if he had
to go at all. He might well have preferred to go along with his fellows, his companions and
neighbors, into the assembly center, if he was to go at all. But what he was protesting, and
the issue which he was seeking to raise, was the fundamental issue in this case, as to whether
or not he could be excluded.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Would you say that if he had wanted to raise the question he
should have obeyed the exclusion order and, upon being subjected to physical restraint, he
should have applied for a writ of habeas corpus? I suppose you agree that in such event he
should have made application for a writ of habeas corpus.
MR. FAHY: Yes. I make that point in my argument, and in our brief we made several
points along that line. However, I stress the fact that as a practical matter he may have
preferred to go that way. He was not protesting the manner of going. He was protesting the
right of the Government to make him go at all. That is what this case is.
Our opponents even go so far as to say not only that detention during evacuation is
involved, but they suggest to this Court that it decide only whether detention violates the
Constitution, and, by indirection, strike down the fundamental thing that was involved in this
whole program, the evacuation, without ever deciding whether or not evacuation was within
the war powers, but simply holding that because it was accompanied by detention, you can
strike down the detention without ever saying a word about the constitutionality of the evacuation. I hope with all my heart and soul that in a program in which 110,000 of these persons
have been evacuated, and he was convicted of remaining in spite of the order of evacuation, it
will not now be held that evacuation was neither constitutional nor unconstitutional, but only
that detention during evacuation was unconstitutional.
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Are we to understand that there was no request for a ruling as
to findings of fact?
MR. FAHY: No, if the Court please; but if detention during evacuation is involved, it
was constitutional.
This is the storyTHE CHIEF JUSTICE: You are passing now the question of whether there was
authority?
MR. FAHY: No. That is a part of the question as to whether it was valid.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: I mean Congressional authority, not constitutional authority.
MR. FAHY: I was corning to the constitutional question.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Approach it in your own way; but is it your view that if the
effect of this order was detention and segregation, and that the Congress did not have that in
mind, therefore we cannot find any ratification in this statute for the order as it is now
interpreted?
MR. FAHY: I think, if the Court please, that is the more logical development of the
argument. Was it authorized?
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: We must decide that question before we come to any constitutional question.
MR. FAHY: The Executive Order, which was ratified by act of Congress-that is, the
Executive Order of February 19th-itself provides that the right of any person to enter, remain, or leave, shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander may impose in his direction. Also the order provided, in terms,
authorization to the Secretary of War and the military cornrnanders"-to take such other steps as he or the appropriate military commander may deem
advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each military area hereinabove authorized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal
agencies, with authority to accept assistance of State and local agencies."
It went on to say that they were authorized to provide transportation, food, shelter, and
other accornodations [sic] necessary in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the military
commander.
The commanding general, under the authority of that order, after the act of Congress
was passed, on March 27, in his proclamation, recited that it was necessary, in order to
provide for the welfare and to insure the orderly evacuation and resettlement of Japanese
voluntarily migrating, to restrict and regulate such migration. The act of Congress itself, on
its face authorized such controls as were exercised, in the phrase to which Chief Justice has
referred.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: That refers to exclusion.
MR. FAHY. The language of the act is:
"That whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or
military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive order of the President, * * *
contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander-"
And so forth.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Does that mean anything more than orders for exclusion?
MR. FAHY: It says more, Your Honor. It says:
"-whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or
military zone prescribed, * * * contrary to the restrictions applicable-"
For example, curfew was a restriction which was applicable.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Curfew was a restriction about which Congress knew.
MR. FAHY: Yes. When Congress enacted the statute, it ratified whatever authority
was in the Executive order, in the broad terms in which the Executive order stood.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Yes. The point I am making is that in interpreting what the
Executive order meant, if there had been a practice of interpretation by military authorities
which included arrest and personal restraint and confinement, that certainly would be a ratification. If Congress did not know about such practice, then you have the question whether,
without that practical interpretation, you can say that the words themselves are broad
enough to include detention.
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MR. F AHY: The interpretation must be based on the breadth of the words themselves.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: You are relying on the language?
MR. FAHY: On the language.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: And the Presidential order.
MR. FAHY: Prior to the act, of course.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Yes.
MR. F AHY: That is correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was the act of Congress subsequent to the act complained
of, or prior thereto?
MR. FAHY: It was prior.
I make the broad argument, in addition, Your Honor, which I made a moment ago, and
which I shall not repeat, that here was a program carried out not simply by the general, but
by the whole executive branch of the Government, with the full knowledge of everyone. The
President brought in the civilian control by his order of March 18, prior to the act of Congress, which gave civilian authorities a part in supervising the evacuation and relocation program. In view of the nature of the program, I think it must be said that all branches of the
Government concerned acquiesced and approved what was done. The whole matter was in
the control of the Executive. The whole matter was known to Congress; and the executive
authorities in particular positions of responsibility construed their authority, without let or
hindrance, to include detention during evacuation. We say that that detention cannot be said
to be beyond the scope of the authority, leaving the question of whether it was within the war
powers, consistent with due process.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE: By evacuation you mean not merely the time necessary
to get the person out of the area, but the whole period when he was to remain out of it?
MR. FAHY: Yes, Your Honor. I wish to explain what happened, so that the Court can
judge the matter of detention. These persons were not prisoners. They were not in concentration camps. These are the facts:
An effort was made by the general to have the persons evacuated voluntarily migrate,
beginning with his proclamations early in March. Out of the 112,000 under the pressure of
the effort of uncontrolled, voluntary exclusion, only a net of about 5,000 left. I say "a net"
because, in fact, about 10,000 moved from their places of residence, but 5,000 of those 10,000
moved into a more remote area in California and Washington, and later had to be evacuated
from there under control.
The problem and the step which had been taken involved the evacuation of between
110,000 and 112,000 people. The voluntary part netted only 5,000. Then the general tried
another method, of setting a deadline and saying, "If you do not go within a certain period
voluntarily, then you will be moved." That did not work. The first such order, which was
issued in March, would have affected 258 persons in the locality covered, and not a single one
of them moved.
In addition, at that time a great wall of hostility grew up in the bordering States when
they were faced with this great migration of persons of Japanese ancestry into those States.
The governors of twelve States met, and all except one vigorously protested to the general
that this simply could not be permitted, that these people could not be permitted to come
flowing into those communities. One of the first things the civilian authorities did when they
were brought into the picture, to take up the work at a certain point where the military could
be permitted to let go, was to recommend that the uncontrolled migration stop. It had not
worked. It was not accomplishing the evacuation. The civilian authority devoted itself to
working out the problem in humanity and decency.
Yesterday our opponents suggested that General DeWitt in his final report says that
from a purely military standpoint, all that was necessary was that they be required to leave;
from which I suppose they wish this Court to draw the conclusion that detention in connection with leaving was unnecessary. What does that amount to? Surely it may be said from
one point of view that from a strictly military standpoint the purpose was to have those
people moved out of a certain area, and not to detain them anywhere; but in the face of the
facts which I have briefly indicated, did they desire the Government in this case to run them
out at the point of a bayonet, to force them out into the desert and into the mountains-old
men, old women, babies in arms, and children-into a hostile area, unprovided for, without
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transportation, without shelter, without food, and without protection? The Government of
the United States had a right to move these people. Does the Bill of Rights require that it
drive them out of the area like a herd of cattle? The stern hand of the Government which
took hold brought about the evacuation. It had a right, a duty, and a responsibility. But if
that were to be done, the stern hand could turn somewhat, as it did, into a gentle hand, to
control this matter in a manner befitting this Government of ours. That was the reason why
the detention of which they talk about occurred.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: How many were affected by the order?
MR. FAHY: 112,000.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: Do you know how many of them were American citizens?
MR. FAHY: About 60,000.
MR. JUSTICE REED: I do not understand that your opponents object to the creation
of the resettlement area, but they object to the forcible detention in the resettlement area.
MR. FAHY: The alternative was to let them go, as I have described, Your Honor.
MR. JUSTICE REED: Was not the alternative to create resettlements where they could
stay if they wished?
MR. FAHY: Does Your Honor mean shelters to which they would go voluntarily?
That was attempted.
MR. JUSTICE REED: No. I mean voluntarily leaving, but once having been evacuated, as you express it, at the point of the bayonet, then a resettlement place wasMR. FAHY: I did not say they were evacuated at the point of the bayonet. I said that
was the alternative, unless it could be controlled, unless they could be required to go.
MR. JUSTICE REED: There was compulsory evacuation.
MR. FAHY: There was compulsory evacuation.
MR. JUSTICE REED: Then, as I understand, there was compulsory detention in the
resettlement area. It was not voluntary detention.
MR. FAHY: That is correct. That is what I mean by compulsory evacuation.
MR. JUSTICE REED: Your opponents do not object to the creation of the resettlement
area. What they object to is compulsory resettlement.
MR. FAHY: It was not a resettlement, Your Honor. What I am talking about is the
assembly center. The assembly center was a place where they were required to go after voluntary evacuation had failed, as a temporary place where they were under detention, and
required to go there as a means of movement out of the military area, under the supervision
and control of the Government.
MR. JUSTICE REED: You are not going beyond evacuation. You are not going to
take up at all in this case-MR. FAHY: I go beyond evacuation to that extent only, so far as concerns the assembly
center phase of the evacuation.
Perhaps I should point out, Your Honor, that there were three phases to the evacuation.
First was the assembly center, the method which was finally adopted to accomplish the evacuation; second, the control and detention during evacuation, so that they would not be scattered out all over the hills; and then there was a third phaseTHE CHIEF JUSTICE: As I understand, what you are arguing is that segregation in an
assembly center was so much an incident to the order of exclusion that it was appropriate and
incidental to it, and was necessarily embraced within it.
MR. FAHY: It was necessary to it, Your Honor. Other measures had failed.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: As I understand Justice Reed's suggestion, it is that the evils
that you refer to would have been equally removed if the Government had established an
assembly center to which these people could go or not, as they chose, and that you would
have accomplished the purposes of the Presidential order and this legislation by an order
excluding them from the military area. Then they could have gone to the assembly center
without constraint, but with such aid as the Government may have chosen to give them, but
without the necessity of an order confining them.
MR. F AHY: I understand.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: I suppose the question is whether those suggestions are enough
to cut under your argument that this segregation order was a necessary incident of exclusion.

56

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 3:35

MR. FAHY: Yes, Your Honor. I cannot see that there is any basis, or sufficient basis,
on which this Court can say that this method was so improper under the circumstances, in
the face of the alternative suggestion by Mr. Justice Reed, that it went beyond the powers of
those who had to make the judgment. I suppose that evacuation may be accomplished in
various methods.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Limited restraint is, of course, deprivation of liberty; and I
suppose we ought not to read it into an order to exclude these people from a certain area
merely by virtue of the fact that authority was given to exclude, unless it is pretty necessary.
MR. FAHY: Unless it is pretty necessary. I agree to that. I shall try to indicate what
the judgment was on that, and the reasons for it. Evacuation without some control was not
accomplishing evacuation. Not only that, but telephone calls and complaints of distress were
coming in from the 5,000 who had already moved out. The communities bordering the evacuated area were at that time extraordinarily hostile.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Who was hostile?
MR. FAHY: The communities bordering the evacuated area; the adjoining States into
which they would have had to go.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: They would not have had to go there if you had had a segregation area to which they could have gone.
MR. FAHY: I am giving the reasons why the control was adopted, Your Honor. Signs
were being posted on the roads to keep them out. Vigilante activities were occurring. The
Government was responsible for this situation, because it had initiated the program. It was
not as though those conditions had arisen without the action of the Government. The civilian authorities reviewed the situation when they came into the picture, and decided and recommended that in their judgment the control of evacuation was essential-and the general so
stated at that time-not only to accomplish the evacuation, but to provide for the welfare of
the evacuees, and to make the evacuation an orderly one.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Is there any suggestion here that it was necessary to place
them under restraint to protect the areas from which they had been excluded?
MR. FAHY: We make that point in our brief, because it seems obvious to me that if
they had been permitted to go at large, and particularly out of the communities where they
had lived, unrestrained, it would have aggravated the situation. It seems obvious, too, that
the lack of control, in view of the reasons for the evacuation with relation to espionage and
sabotage, was something which fitted into the basic reasons for evacuation. I must point out,
however, that that phase of it is not, I think, mentioned in the military reports as a reason for
the detention aspect, as distinct from the prior voluntary evacuation.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: Will you refresh my recollection? As I recall, the
curfew hour in the Hirabayashi case was 9 o'clock. Suppose it had been a 24-hour curfew. Is
there anything in the Hirabayashi opinion which would indicate that that would not have
been within the tests of that case?
MR. FAHY: No. Of course, you would have the question then as to whether the
method of the curfew was being used to accomplish real custody.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: Of course, I am not passing judgment on what was
wise or sensible; but in the setting of this case, as a matter of constitutional power and authority, is it conceivable that we would overrule the judgment that a 24-hour curfew would be
required if any limited-hour curfew were required?
MR. FAHY: I should think not, Your Honor.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: I mean on the basis of the tests involved in that
case.
MR. FAHY: I think there might even be more question of that than of the detention
which was involved in this case.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: I was getting at it the other way. Suppose the curfew were for all but two hours of the day.
MR. FAHY: Certainly that would have been valid.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: Then it comes down to the question of whether that
was a feasible means of enforcing such an order in that environment, and with the means at
the disposal of the military, considering the number of troops necessary to watch them, and
so forth.
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MR. F AHY: That is correct.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: What is the difference whether there is limited detention within their homes, or whether more freedom is given? I am talking about power. I
am not questioning whether it was a wise thing to do. Frankly, I think nothing should have
been done; but that is not the question, is it?
MR. FAHY: That is not the question.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS: Did the relocation phase of the program come into being
subsequent to the evacuation order? What I have in the back of my mind is this: Was detention used as an intermediate step to ultimate relocation, or was it the end, in and of itself, at
that time?
MR. FAHY: Detention in the assembly center?
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS: Detention in the assembly center.
MR. FAHY: It was used as an intermediate, temporary stage of evacuation, and nothing else. Detention in the assembly centers completely ceased in September, 1942. These
huge places were set up, to which these 112,000 people were brought in connection with their
removal from the military area. If they were to be in the area, they must have been in detention while they were in the area; so until they could be moved out of the area, they were
detained in the assembly center, to accomplish the evacuation. It is a program which is long
since over. There is no longer any detention center, and has not been since the fall of 1942.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Suppose we accept your opponents' premise that ultimate detention and segregation were the necessary results of exclusion in this case, first at an assembly center, and then at some other point of relocation. Suppose we accept that premise for
purposes of argument.
MR. FAHY: Yes.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Then the question is whether physical restraint and detention,
whether in the assembly center or as an immediate consequence of it at the place where they
were sent, first, was within the order.
MR. FAHY: Yes.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Second, was it within the authority to make the order?
MR. FAHY: Yes.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: And third, if so, whether it is constitutional.
MR. FAHY: That is the development of my argument. Prior to that, I make the argument that it is not involved in the case. My present argument is on the assumption that it is.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: If it is not, most of the rest of the case disappears.
MR. FAHY: All except the evacuation.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: In reading through the demurrer to the information
I notice a certain phrase, and I wonder if it does not lend itself to the implication that it
imposes upon the defendant a choice between exclusion and forcible evacuation. Are you
saying that evacuationMR. FAHY: It was compulsory. He had to move under force of law.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: But he could go where he would.
MR. FAHY: Yes. That is the way I interpret it. That was the situation originally.
MR. JUSTICE REED: I understand your argument in this case to be that so far as the
information is concerned, it relates only to the exclusion. That is your first argument.
MR. FAHY: Yes; that is my first argument.
MR. JUSTICE REED: We do not even have the place of detention; but assuming that
we take the place of detention into consideration, is it your position that that was a part of the
process of evacuation?
MR. FAHY: Exactly.
MR. JUSTICE REED: But never under any circumstances must we take up and consider that we might look at the question of resettlement.
MR. FAHY: I come to that, Your Honor. I am just going back, in view of what Your
Honor has said. I do not take up that question in this case on the merits. It is involved, if it
is urged, in the Endo case, following this case. The reason I do not take it up on the merits in
this case is that clearly, in my opinion, it is in any event not involved in this case, even if
detention during evacuation is involved.
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MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is necessarily involved, is it not, in the logic of decision?
Do you suggest any ground on which this Court could say that you can detain these people in
the way they were detained in a relocation center?
MR. FAHY: Temporarily, during evacuation, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Temporarily during evacuation. That would not justify
detaining them permanently if hostility to them should continue.
MR. FAHY: That is correct, your honor.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where would detention to protect them end? What will
ever terminate this business?
MR. FAHY: Your Honor, the matter had a development which must be viewed. Detention in the assembly centers, as I have pointed out, was a method of accomplishing
evacuation.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The reason it was compulsory, as I understand, was to
protect them from the hostility of the people.
MR F AHY: That was one of the reasons. The other reasons were the reasons which I
have stated, one of which was that voluntary evacuation had failed. They would not go
voluntarily.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They did not have any place to go, I suppose.
MR. F AHY: That is correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They did not know where to go.
MR. FAHY: They would not know where to go. If they had to be moved, the Government had to do more than ask them to move, and that is what led to the assembly center. It
is true that the War Relocation Authority itself was created by Executive order on March 18,
and the War Relocation Authority, which is more directly involved in the Endo case, took
over the final stage of the program.
Most of those who were in the assembly centers as part of the evacuation ultimately
found themselves, of necessity under the program, in the third and last place so far as Government supervision was concerned, namely, the relocation center. But at the time this offense occurred, in early May, when this exclusion order as applied to Mr. Korematsu was
issued, he could not say, and he cannot now say, that if he had gone, in the method prescribed, into an assembly center, he would ever have found himself in a relocation center.
That, Mr. Justice Reed, is the reason I say that in no event is the final relocation phase of the
program involved in this case, as distinguished from the Endo case.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Why do you say that he would not, under these orders, find
himself in a relocation center?
MR. FAHY: Because not all who went to the assembly center were sent to a relocation
center.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: How were they excluded?
MR. FAHY: They were given permission to leave the assembly center.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: On what basis?
MR. FAHY: For security reasons.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: On what basis were they released?
MR. FAHY: They were permitted to go out, most of them, to accept positions, others
to live with their families, and so forth. There were various miscellaneous reasons. Only
about 2,000 were so released.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Was that on the ground that they were not dangerous?
MR. FAHY: Yes.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Did the Government set up any means of ascertaining who
was dangerous and who was not?
MR. FAHY: It passed upon the individual cases on applications for permits to the
headquarters of the Western Defense Command.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: So he, after being in the assembly center, or on his way there,
could have applied for leave?
MR. FAHY: Yes.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: If he had applied for leave, would it have been considered?
MR. FAHY: There was no formal procedure or administrative machinery set up, but
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individual applications were made to the headquarters of the Western Defense Command,
and acted upon.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The Government had never established any procedure for the
purpose of liberating people who were entitled to be liberated, in their judgment?
MR. FAHY: Oh, yes; it has since done so, Your Honor.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: I mean at that time.
MR. FAHY: At that time, no. It was on the basis of permission. It was stated in the
orders of detention in the assembly centers that they were to be detained unless permitted to
leave; and such permissions were granted. But in addition to that, he could not say, because
the program had not sufficiently developedTHE CHIEF JUSTICE: Was that machinery established before this indictment was
found?
MR. FAHY: Yes, if you call it machinery, Your Honor.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Call it a system, or program, or whatever you choose to call it.
MR. F AHY: Permissions were granted prior to that.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Was there anything in this case which would have prevented
this petitioner from applying for the benefit of that machinery, system, or program?
MR. FAHY: He could have applied for a permit. There was nothing to prevent him
from doing that.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE: There was nothing to assure him such a right, either.
MR. FAHY: No, sir.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: Did you say that it was well known-1 think you
used the word "notorious"-<>r that it was provided in the order that a man could apply and
obtain exemption?
MR. FAHY: The order says that he may not leave unless permitted to do so by the
headquarters of the commanding general. Some were permitted to leave. But it seems to me,
as a practical matter, that there was an equally strong reason for saying that the third and last
stage, namely, the relocation center, is not involved. So far as anything in the record is
concerned, he was not consciousTHE CHIEF JUSTICE: What I am speaking about is this-and I do not know whether
it comes into this case or not. Where there is an administrative procedure for relief from
obligations and duties under a statute which may be unconstitutional, the minute you challenge the constitutionality of it you forfeit your right to claim the benefits of the statute. I am
wondering whether you can say it was as simple as that in this case-whether he had notice
of that procedure and did not resort to it.
MR. FAHY: If evacuation was valid on the basis on which it was undertaken, there had
to be a control over the evacuees from the standpoint of the reasons for the evacuation. The
reasons were that there was an unknown number of disloyal persons within a certain group
which included, no doubt, a large number of loyal persons, and that the class had to be
moved. Does it not necessarily follow from that, keeping in mind the purpose of the evacuation itself, that some time must be permitted for control over the class, until you can accomplish the very thing which led to the evacuation, and find out who were the loyal and disloyal
ones? It seems to me that in itself is a sufficient justification for a period of detention, because
the very purpose of the evacuation was to be rid, in a certain area, of those who might cause
damage to the defense of the West Coast.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Does it appear anywhere how long that detention was, or how
temporary it was?
MR. FAHY: It varied, Your Honor. It was a staggered program. They were moved
from certain areas today, certain other areas the next week, and still other areas the following
week. They went into the assembly centers, during the staggered period of time, and they
went out the same way. The evacuation began in March. Everyone was out of the assembly
centers the following September.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE: Assuming all that you say, and that the detention to
make the sifting process would be within the constitutional power, still, under the order he
was required to submit to it without any assurance that that process would be performed
within some reasonable period of time, in order to be valid.
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MR. F AHY: I think that is holding those in charge of the program under too rigid a
method.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE: It is one thing to submit to imprisonment to go through a
period of sifting to determine one's loyalty to his country. It may be an entirely different
thing to submit to indefinite imprisonment, without any promise or assurance of opportunity
for such sifting to take place.
MR. FAHY: This whole program took time. The Government has never, from the
beginning to this day, denied the principle. It has been the theory of the Government, and of
all those involved in any responsibility in this case, that these people must be restored to their
full liberty of which they were deprived by reason of military necessity. In the face of the
difficulties and magnitude of the program, it seems to me that every reasonable method has
been devised to accomplish the desired result. No one can help but regret the time it has
taken, but there has never been any denial of the goal. There has never been any difference of
opinion about the goal which the Government set out to achieve, which was the eventual
complete restoration of their rights and freedom as citizens.
In the same document referred to yesterday, containing the report of Mr. Justice Byrnes
on the relocation program, the President, in his message to the Senate in response to its
resolution, stated:
"With the segregation of the disloyal evacuees in a separate center-"
That was accomplished.
"-the War Relocation Authority proposes now to redouble its efforts to accomplish the
relocation into family homes and jobs in communities throughout the United States, but
outside the evacuated area, of those Americans of Japanese ancestry whose loyalty to this
country has remained unshaken through the hardships of the evacuation which military necessity made unavoidable. We shall restore to the loyal evacuees the right to return to the
evacuated areas as soon as the military situation will make such restoration feasible. Americans of Japanese ancestry, like those of many other ancestries, have shown that they can and
want to accept our institutions and work loyally with the rest of us, making their own valuable contribution to the national wealth and wellbeing. In vindication of the very ideals for
which we are fighting this war, it is important for us to maintain a high standard of fair and
equal treatment of the people of this minority, as of all other minorities."
That has been the position of the Government all through this program. It took time. It
is one of the most difficult problems that the Government inside the United States has ever
had to deal with, once the evacuation was decided upon. These people suffered hardships and
inconveniences, and temporary deprivation of their liberties and freedom; but it must be
viewed in the perspective of this whole war. Many persons endure, and are required to endure, dislocations and changes in their lives and fortunes. Millions of people, including hundreds of thousands of our own citizens, have already become casualties of the war. This
program should not, under the Bill of Rights, be looked at as isolated from the whole, of
which it is a part.
These citizens have been taken care of in the best manner, under the circumstances, that
a fair and efficient government could possibly bring about. The personnel of the Government
agencies involved are devoted to the task of restoring them, as soon as conditions will permit
and administrative methods can be devised, to the complete freedom-assuming loyalty--of
which they were temporarily deprived by reason of military necessity. I think that most of
them have seen it that way, and have cooperated with the Government. It seems to me that
those who have been injured-as many have, temporarily-should be asked to view the situation along with the great injuries, losses, sufferings, and hardships of millions of our people in
the fight of the nation for its life.
Once you establish to your own satisfaction that this was a part of a necessary military
measure to ward off, or assist in warding off the threat caused by the eruption of the Japanese,
in combination with Hitler, to destroy the very life of the nation, you get a true perspective of
the problem.

